

1                                   **DIRECT TESTIMONY OF**  
2                                   **THOMAS R. OSBORNE**  
3                                   **ON BEHALF OF**  
4                                   **SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY**  
5                                   **DOCKET NO. 2004-178-E**  
6

7   **Q.   PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION AND BUSINESS**  
8       **ADDRESS.**

9   A.           My name is Thomas R. Osborne. I am a Managing Director in the Global  
10           Power Group within UBS Investment Bank (“UBS”). My business address is UBS  
11           Investment Bank LLC, 299 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10171.

12  
13   **Q.   MR.   OSBORNE   PLEASE   STATE   YOUR   EDUCATIONAL**  
14       **BACKGROUND.**

15   A.           I hold a Bachelor of Arts degree, with distinction, from the University of  
16           Virginia, where I was elected to Phi Beta Kappa.

17  
18   **Q.   WHAT IS YOUR BUSINESS BACKGROUND?**

19   A.           As a Managing Director within the Global Power Group at UBS Investment  
20           Bank, I am primarily responsible for investment banking coverage of regulated  
21           electric, gas and water utility companies, independent power producers and related  
22           power industry participants. I joined UBS Investment Bank’s predecessor firm in

1 May 2001 after spending five years as a Director in the Global Energy Group at  
2 Credit Suisse First Boston. Prior to joining Credit Suisse First Boston, I spent nine  
3 years (1987-1996) in the Utility Investment Banking Group at PaineWebber  
4 Incorporated, holding the titles of analyst, associate, vice president and first vice  
5 president. During my seventeen years of investment banking experience, I have  
6 worked on transactions with an aggregate value in excess of US\$40 billion. I have  
7 extensive experience with corporate utility issuers in the equity and fixed income  
8 capital markets. Additionally, I have advised utilities on numerous mergers and  
9 acquisitions (“M&A”) and generation asset divestitures, as well as restructurings.  
10 In recent years I led the financial advisory teams within UBS for numerous  
11 projects including a fairness opinion on behalf of TXU Corp in the divestiture of  
12 its Australian businesses, Sierra Pacific Resources’ liability management and debt  
13 restructuring program, and numerous capital markets transactions, including recent  
14 issuances of bonds by Midwest Generation and Sempra Energy.

15  
16 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TESTIMONY BEFORE THE**  
17 **PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA?**

18 A. Yes. In January 2002, in Docket No. 01-220-6, I provided testimony on  
19 behalf of South Carolina Pipeline Corporation with respect to identifying a group

1 of publicly traded companies that faced similar business and financial risks to  
2 those of the applicant. That case was subsequently withdrawn.

3 In November 2002, in Docket No. 2002-223-E, I provided testimony on  
4 behalf of South Carolina Electric and Gas (“SCE&G” or the “Company”) with  
5 respect to identifying publicly traded companies that face business and financial  
6 risks comparable to those of SCE&G.

7  
8 **Q. MR. OSBORNE, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE OF YOUR**  
9 **TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING.**

10 A. South Carolina Electric and Gas (“SCE&G” or the “Company”) has  
11 requested my expert opinion in identifying publicly traded companies (the “Peer  
12 Group”) that face business and financial risks comparable to those of SCE&G.  
13 The Peer Group is included as Exhibit Nos. \_\_\_ (TRO-1 and 2), which are attached  
14 to this testimony.

1 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS FACED BY**  
2 **SCE&G AND THE COMPARABLE COMPANIES.**

3 A. As part of my selection of companies for the Peer Group, I gave careful  
4 consideration to companies with business risks and financial risks similar to those  
5 of SCE&G.

6 As primarily regulated utilities, SCE&G and the Peer Group collectively  
7 are exposed to similar business risks which include, among other factors,  
8 regulatory and legislative actions including rate setting, deregulation or the threat  
9 of deregulation, and the imposition of environmental controls legislation;  
10 fluctuating power demand resulting from a variable macroeconomic environment  
11 and/or weather conditions; customer and/or asset concentration; commodity price  
12 volatility and fuel supply risk. These risk factors have the potential to materially  
13 affect a company's ability to effectively and profitably execute its business plan by  
14 causing, among other things, increased levels of counterparty risk; increased risk  
15 of default on debt obligations or on energy, fuel or transportation contracts and the  
16 resulting operating effects of the inability to execute such transactions; increased  
17 exposure to commodity price volatility and other macroeconomic risks; loss of  
18 competitive position within the respective service area; and/or higher levels of  
19 competition, which could lead to a lower market share and/or a higher risk  
20 customer mix. These business risks are reflected in metrics such as, among others,  
21 Standard and Poor's business profile scores, asset concentration, the percentage

1 contribution of assets from unregulated businesses, fuel supply concentration,  
2 customer segmentation, and relative cost competitiveness.

3 In my analysis and selection of the Peer Group, I have also focused on  
4 financial metrics which provide information on SCE&G's risk-return profile. As  
5 with the business risks, SCE&G and the Peer Group collectively are exposed to  
6 similar financial risks which include, among other factors, rising operating costs  
7 and the negative effects that higher interest rates or restricted access to capital can  
8 have on capital-intensive businesses with relatively high levels of financial  
9 leverage, including reduced financial flexibility, as well as a deterioration in cash  
10 flows and the ability to service debt and pay dividends. These risk factors have the  
11 ability to adversely affect a company by increasing the cost of capital and/or  
12 restricting access to the capital markets, reducing financial flexibility thus  
13 increasing the cost of financial distress and/or likelihood of default, which could  
14 materially affect management's ability to effectively and profitably execute its  
15 business plan and which could thus negatively impact operating earnings. The  
16 financial metrics selected to assess these risks include market capitalization,  
17 financial leverage, interest coverage ratios, credit ratings, dividend yield and  
18 implied valuation multiples, among others. The rationale for the selection of these  
19 metrics was that they provide information and insight about a company's financial  
20 flexibility, quality of earnings and cash flows, sustainability of profit margins and  
21 ability to access the capital markets.

1 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS YOUR CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING A**  
2 **PEER GROUP FOR SCE&G.**

3 A. I have formulated my opinion based on seventeen years of financial  
4 industry experience within the utility sector. As you are aware, SCE&G's  
5 operations are primarily regulated electric and natural gas businesses. The Peer  
6 Group for SCE&G was selected based on a comparison of several key operational  
7 and financial metrics across a range of U.S. utility companies from various  
8 geographic regions. Among the key metrics I considered are: total market  
9 capitalization, capital structure, financial leverage, credit ratings, Standard and  
10 Poor's business profile score, the overall contribution of assets and operational  
11 flows from regulated electric and regulated gas operations, the extent of  
12 investment in unregulated businesses, and profitability.

13 The companies in the Peer Group were selected based upon their asset mix  
14 being comprised principally of utility operations. I also considered the fact that  
15 SCE&G serves approximately twice the number of electric customers as it does  
16 natural gas customers and as such employs fixed assets which are weighted  
17 towards the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. Furthermore,  
18 SCE&G's financial leverage, credit ratings and profitability, among other factors,  
19 suggest that the company should be compared to a peer group with credit ratings  
20 reasonably proximate to those of SCE&G within the investment-grade spectrum.

1        These were my primary considerations when determining the appropriate subset of  
2        peers to select from the universe of regulated U.S. electric and gas utilities.

3  
4        **Q.    COULD YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FACTORS CURRENTLY**  
5        **INFLUENCING INVESTORS' VIEWS OF ELECTRIC AND GAS**  
6        **UTILITIES AS INVESTMENT VEHICLES?**

7        A.        In recent years, the risk of investing in the utility sector has increased  
8        significantly. Utilities currently face numerous uncertainties with regard to: (1)  
9        regulation; (2) the structure of the wholesale power markets; (3) interest rates; (4)  
10       fuel and other commodity prices; (5) environmental controls legislation; (6) rising  
11       pension, insurance and other costs; and, (7) macro-economic conditions, which  
12       impact customer growth and the growth in the demand for electricity. To continue  
13       to attract investor capital, the utility sector as a whole and each individual  
14       company must provide sufficiently high returns to compensate investors for their  
15       investment risks.

16       Over the last 24 months or so, many companies in the utilities sector have  
17       returned to a “back-to-basics” strategy that is focused on core regulated utility  
18       transmission, distribution and, in some cases, generation operations. This together  
19       with the desire to strengthen their credit position has pushed companies to shed  
20       non-core assets and reduce leverage. However, in the context of a somewhat

1 constrained economic recovery, the sector will be challenged to produce longer-  
2 term growth from its remaining operations. Regulated electric and gas utilities  
3 tend to be slow growth businesses, a fact further compounded by margin pressures  
4 resulting from rising operating costs (including commodity supply costs, labor  
5 costs, pension and insurance expenses), and lingering oversupply and weak spark  
6 spreads in the wholesale markets which limit the profitability of off-system sales.  
7 The sector also continues to face environmental risks and the political  
8 uncertainties that often accompany such risk.

9 As a result of these pressures, many of the companies that have adopted the  
10 “back-to-basics” strategy have revised and lowered their long-term earnings  
11 growth guidance to the market. On August 1<sup>st</sup>, 2002, (the date of Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_  
12 (TRO–2) in my testimony filed in Docket No. 2002-223-E) the average FirstCall  
13 long-term EPS growth rate for the power sector was approximately 7.2%,  
14 compared to approximately 5.1% as of July 1, 2004, the date of Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_  
15 (TRO–1) as filed with this testimony.

16 Credit quality continues to be an important issue for electric utilities, and  
17 the rating agencies have made clear that they will closely scrutinize the regulatory  
18 decisions expected in the current industry “cycle” of rate case proceedings.  
19 Negative regulatory outcomes often result in lowered credit ratings and increased  
20 cost of capital. Equity financings have provided an opportunity for companies to  
21 repair balance sheets, but have led to share dilution resulting in lower EPS. This



1 has placed pressure on utility share valuations. Utility share valuations are also  
2 likely to come under pressure in the face of rising interest rates, as historically  
3 utility share prices have tended to move inversely with long-term U.S. Treasury  
4 bond yields.

5  
6 **Q. WHAT IMPACT DOES THE REGULATOR HAVE ON THE PERCEIVED**  
7 **RISK OF UTILITY SECURITIES?**

8 A. Capital is a limited financial resource that is allocated only to those entities  
9 that meet the risk-return requirements of investors. This allocation of financial  
10 resources occurs in the capital markets and as such, the actions of the state  
11 regulatory commission are not only a matter of public policy, but also a matter of  
12 financial policy as the attention of the financial markets is closely focused on how  
13 policies, actions, and decisions of state regulators affect investors' expected  
14 returns. The Commission and the Company have reason to give careful and  
15 thoughtful consideration to the requirements of the capital markets, because they  
16 are the mechanisms that price risk and allocate available capital to the users of  
17 capital – corporations, individuals and governments. The Commission's actions on  
18 matters such as cost recovery, balancing of customers' and shareholders' interests,  
19 quality of service, deregulation, and authorized rates of return materially impact

1 valuation as a result of how adequately the company's expected return  
2 compensates investors for their assumption of risk.

3 Much to the credit of the Commission and SCE&G, the Company has been  
4 a financially sound utility. The Commission's continued support of SCE&G  
5 through its thoughtful and equitable actions is imperative to engendering investor  
6 confidence and maintaining a stable operating environment which, in turn, will  
7 allow SCE&G to more effectively compete for the capital resources that it requires  
8 to provide reliable service at a reasonable cost to its customers. Moreover, the  
9 Company's ability to earn reasonable rates of return on its equity is the product of  
10 both fair and timely regulatory treatment and positive financial and operating  
11 policies instituted by management. Continuation of these policies over the coming  
12 years will be critically important to investors in light of the lingering uncertainty  
13 around the evolving structure and regulation of the wholesale power markets,  
14 continuing competitive pressures and volatility of commodity prices.

15  
16 **Q. WHAT TYPE OF COMPANY WOULD YOU DEEM COMPARABLE FOR**  
17 **PURPOSES OF CALCULATING SCE&G'S COST OF CAPITAL?**

18 A. I would consider an ideal comparable company to be a regulated generator,  
19 transmitter and distributor of electricity and natural gas to a stable mix of  
20 residential, industrial, and commercial customers. The company would have little

1 in the way of unregulated operations but would carry principally regulatory and  
2 operational risk. Lastly, the company would operate in a state(s) which remain  
3 primarily regulated at the generation, transmission and distribution levels. To this  
4 end, I believe the companies listed in Exhibit Nos. \_\_\_\_ (TRO-1 and 2) accurately  
5 reflect comparable companies for SCE&G.

6  
7 **Q. WHY DO YOU VIEW THE COMPARABLES YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED**  
8 **AS APPROPRIATE?**

9 A. There are very few publicly traded companies that have the same business  
10 model and business risk profile as SCE&G. For this reason, I have assembled a  
11 group of comparables whose risks are, in the aggregate, reasonably comparable to  
12 those of SCE&G. I have included companies from two categories: Integrated  
13 Utilities with both regulated electric and regulated natural gas operations, as well  
14 as Electric Utilities, which based on SCE&G's status as primarily an electric  
15 service provider, also provide a fair proxy for the Company. Each of these  
16 companies was selected based on its overall comparability and its exposure to  
17 business and financial risks similar to those of SCE&G.

18 These companies are primarily regulated entities that have investment-  
19 grade credit ratings, have a relatively modest proportion of unregulated businesses,  
20 and have manageable exposure to commodity price volatility. These companies

1 are comparable to SCE&G in that they are similar in size and face similar  
2 regulatory, operational, environmental, and general financial risk. I believe the  
3 Peer Group is thus an appropriate set of comparable companies for evaluating  
4 SCE&G's cost of equity capital.

5  
6 **Q. IN YOUR TESTIMONY IN SCE&G'S 2002 RATE CASE, YOU INCLUDED**  
7 **DPL INC., GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC. AND IDACORP, INC. IN**  
8 **YOUR EXHIBIT NOS. \_\_\_ (TRO-1 AND 2) YOU HAVE EXCLUDED**  
9 **THESE THREE COMPANIES. WHY DO YOU NOW EXCLUDE THEM?**

10 A. I now exclude these companies because they no longer meet the criteria for  
11 inclusion in the Peer Group. For various reasons, they no longer have financial  
12 and business characteristics suggesting that it would be appropriate to include  
13 them in an analysis designed to determine the cost of capital for SCE&G. I  
14 address my specific reasons for excluding each of these three companies in the  
15 following responses.

16  
17 **Q. WHY HAVE YOU EXCLUDED DPL INC. ("DPL")?**

18 A. On July 30, 2003, Moody's downgraded DPL's senior unsecured credit  
19 rating to Ba1, which is below investment grade. Also, the company has not filed  
20 with the Securities and Exchange Commission its 2003 Form 10-K due to an

1 internal accounting investigation and as a result, the company is currently unable  
2 to access the capital markets. For these reasons, the company is ineligible for  
3 inclusion in the Peer Group.

4  
5 **Q. WHY HAVE YOU EXCLUDED GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC. (“GXP”)?**

6 A. On June 2, 2004, Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) released new business profile  
7 scores for U.S. utility companies. GXP was assigned a business profile score of 7.  
8 According to credit research published by Standard & Poor’s on June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2004:  
9 “The score reflects the primacy and average business profile of the company’s  
10 integrated utility business, KCP&L... The score also reflects the above-average  
11 business risk and continued expansion of retail energy supplier affiliate Strategic  
12 Energy. The score assumes that Strategic Energy will continue to achieve high  
13 levels of sales and earnings growth through at least 2006, as projected by Great  
14 Plains.”

15 While investment in unregulated businesses is not in my opinion cause for  
16 automatically excluding a company from the Peer Group, GXP’s expansion of  
17 Strategic Energy when combined with GXP’s S&P business profile score of 7  
18 suggests that the company’s business risks are materially different from those of  
19 SCE&G. For those reasons, I have excluded GXP from the Peer Group.

1   **Q.   WHY HAVE YOU EXCLUDED IDACORP, INC. (“IDA”)?**

2   A.           I have excluded IDA because of the numerous recent changes to its  
3           operating profile. Since the end of 2002, IDA has undertaken a number of steps to  
4           address changes in the Western power markets and extreme drought affecting its  
5           hydro operations. In addition to shedding its non-core assets, the company cut its  
6           dividend by 35% on September 18, 2003. IDA has also experienced changing  
7           regulatory circumstances. The Idaho Public Utility Commission (“IPUC”), which  
8           historically has been viewed as relatively evenhanded in balancing the interests of  
9           shareholders and ratepayers, has recently issued a ruling, which is viewed by the  
10          market and me as punitive, granting IDA’s utility subsidiary, Idaho Power, a  
11          general rate case increase of only \$25.3 million, or 5.2%, versus a request of \$85.6  
12          million, or a 17% increase in rates. The IPUC’s decision set IDA’s allowed return  
13          on equity at only 10.25%, compared to 11.2% requested by the company. As a  
14          result of the negative regulatory outcome, both S&P and Moody’s placed the  
15          company on creditwatch-negative with a review for possible downgrade.  
16          Furthermore, from the beginning of the year to the announcement of the rate  
17          decision, IDA’s share price fell 9%, and declined an additional 5% upon release of  
18          the final order in this rate proceeding. Although I would not necessarily exclude a  
19          company based solely on its placement on creditwatch-negative, the combination  
20          of the increasingly adverse regulatory environment exhibited by this recent rate

1 decision, along with the other challenges faced by the company at this time leads  
2 me to conclude that IDA is ineligible for inclusion in the Peer Group.  
3

4 **Q. WHY HAVE YOU INCLUDED WISCONSIN ENERGY CORPORATION**  
5 **(“WEC”) AND WPS RESOURCES CORPORATION (“WPS”) IN YOUR**  
6 **COMPARABLE PEER GROUP?**

7 A. WEC has been included as it fulfills many of the criteria for inclusion in the  
8 Peer Group. The company’s total market capitalization is within the range of mid-  
9 cap companies as set by Ibbotson, the company has investment grade credit ratings  
10 and a Standard and Poor’s business profile score of 5. The company is active in  
11 the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. It also has a high  
12 proportion of regulated assets, with only 17% of its capital invested in non-  
13 regulated assets.

14 I have included WPS because it also fulfills many of the criteria for  
15 inclusion in the Peer Group. The company’s total market capitalization is within  
16 the range of mid-cap companies as set by Ibbotson, the company has investment  
17 grade credit ratings and a Standard and Poor’s business profile score of 5. The  
18 company is active in the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity  
19 and has manageable exposure to non-regulated business.  
20

1    **Q.     DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

2    A.           Yes.